DISMISSAL OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION ON DUAL GROUNDS

INDIAN LEGAL REVIEW — ONLINE JOURNAL OF LAW & PRACTICE

Vol. 1  |  February 2026  |  ISSN (Online): XXXX-XXXX

Peer-Reviewed  |  Open Access  |  DOI: 10.XXXXX/ILR.2026.001

DISMISSAL OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION ON DUAL GROUNDS:

A Critical Analysis of Delay, Merit, and the Caveator’s Role

Guvvala Ramakrishna Reddy & Anr. v. Guvvala Satyanarayana Reddy & Ors.

SLP (Civil) Diary No. 6439/2026 | Supreme Court of India | Decided: February 10, 2026

Argued on behalf of the Caveator/Respondent by

Advocate Vikas Kumar Pandey

ABSTRACT

This article presents a comprehensive academic analysis of the Supreme Court of India’s order dated February 10, 2026, dismissing Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No. 6439/2026 in the matter of Guvvala Ramakrishna Reddy & Anr. v. Guvvala Satyanarayana Reddy & Ors. The dismissal was grounded on two independent and co-existent bases: first, an unexplained gross delay of 646 days in filing the petition; and second, absence of merit on examination of the impugned judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati in Second Appeal No. 427/2010.

The article examines the legal framework governing special leave petitions under Article 136 of the Constitution, the doctrine of condonation of delay under the Limitation Act 1963, the scope of second appellate jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and the procedural rights of a caveator under Section 148-A CPC.

Special attention is devoted to the role and advocacy strategy of Advocate Vikas Kumar Pandey, who appeared as arguing counsel for the caveator, and whose submissions across all three dimensions — delay, stay, and merits — contributed materially to the outcome.

Keywords: Special Leave Petition, Article 136, Condonation of Delay, Sufficient Cause, Second Appeal, Caveator, Section 148-A CPC, Supreme Court of India, Limitation Act 1963.

I.  Introduction

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, 1950 ¹ represents one of the most expansive — and simultaneously most discretionary — appellate powers conferred upon any apex court in the democratic world.

Unlike ordinary appellate rights, the special leave jurisdiction is neither defined nor circumscribed by the nature of the dispute, the court of origin, or the stage of proceedings. It is, at its core, a plenary power of superintendence that the Court exercises ex gratia — as an indulgence extended to deserving litigants who demonstrate that substantial justice warrants intervention.

Yet this expansiveness is tempered by a critical gatekeeper: the Law of Limitation. The Supreme Court Rules, 2013 ² prescribe a limitation period within which a petitioner must approach the Court, and any deviation from this timeline must be accompanied by a credible showing of ‘sufficient cause.’

The courts have consistently held that this requirement is not a mere technicality — it is a substantive protection of the rights of the successful litigant to enjoy the finality of a judgment obtained in their favour.

The matter of Guvvala Ramakrishna Reddy & Anr. v. Guvvala Satyanarayana Reddy & Ors., decided by a Division Bench of the Supreme Court comprising Hon’ble Mr. Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Hon’ble Mr. Justice K.V. Viswanathan on February 10, 2026, furnishes an instructive paradigm of how the Court responds when both these thresholds — timeliness and merit — fail simultaneously.

The SLP was dismissed on the twin grounds of gross unexplained delay of 646 days and absence of good ground to interfere with the High Court’s order. The caveator’s position was ably represented by Advocate Vikas Kumar Pandey, whose multi-pronged advocacy is examined in this article.

This article proceeds in seven parts. Part II provides the factual and procedural background. Part III analyses the legal framework for SLPs under Article 136. Part IV scrutinises the doctrine of condonation of delay. Part V examines the High Court’s jurisdiction in second appeal and the merits dimension.

Part VI is devoted to the caveator’s rights and the role of Advocate Vikas Kumar Pandey. Part VII offers conclusions and broader implications for appellate practice.

II.  Factual and Procedural Background

2.1  The Dispute and Its Origins

The matter in question has its origins in a civil dispute between members of the Guvvala family — a pattern of property or succession-related litigation not uncommon in Indian courts. The specifics of the underlying dispute, having been filtered through three tiers of adjudication before reaching the Supreme Court, do not fall for elaborate examination at this stage; however, their procedural trajectory is instructive.

The matter was litigated at the level of the trial court and subsequently carried in first appeal. Upon the first appellate court returning a finding adverse to what would ultimately be the respondents, the matter was taken in Second Appeal — SA No. 427/2010 — before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati. ³ Second Appeals, as noted above, are restricted by Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ⁴ to substantial questions of law, and do not generally permit re-appreciation of factual findings.

2.2  The High Court’s Judgment

The High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati delivered its final judgment and order in SA No. 427/2010 on December 26, 2023. The judgment was adverse to the petitioners — who were likely the appellants before the High Court — and upheld the findings of the courts below.

It is significant that the High Court’s judgment was rendered on a substantial question of law, meaning it had been framed and addressed in accordance with the requirements of Section 100 CPC.

The period between the High Court’s judgment (December 26, 2023) and the filing of the SLP before the Supreme Court is the crux of the procedural controversy. Under Order XIX Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, ⁵ a petition for special leave to appeal must ordinarily be filed within ninety days of the impugned order.

The petitioners, however, filed the SLP in 2026 — placing the delay at approximately 646 days beyond the date of the impugned judgment, or approximately 556 days beyond the prescribed limitation period.

2.3  The Interlocutory Applications

Along with the SLP, two interlocutory applications were filed. IA No. 41657/2026 sought condonation of the 646-day delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. ⁶ IA No. 41654/2026 was a stay application seeking suspension of the High Court’s order pending disposal of the SLP.

Both applications were strenuously opposed by Advocate Vikas Kumar Pandey on behalf of the caveator/respondents.

III.  Article 136 and the Nature of Special Leave Jurisdiction

3.1  Constitutional Scope

Article 136(1) of the Constitution of India vests in the Supreme Court the power to grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India. The provision is framed in the broadest possible terms — ‘any court or tribunal’, ‘any cause or matter’ — reflecting the Constituent Assembly’s intention to create an ultimate reservoir of judicial power to prevent miscarriages of justice.⁷

However, the Constitution itself, through Article 136(2), carves out courts or tribunals constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces from this jurisdiction. Beyond this express exception, the jurisdiction is facially unlimited.

3.2  Discretionary Character: Not a Right but an Indulgence

The critical limitation on Article 136, however, is judicial rather than constitutional — it lies in the principle that special leave is not a right of appeal but an indulgence granted at the Court’s discretion. ⁸ The Supreme Court does not function as a regular court of appeal under Article 136. It intervenes only where there has been a serious miscarriage of justice, a patent error of law, perversity of findings, or a question of great public importance. ⁹

The distinction is fundamental. In ordinary appeals, the appellate court re-examines the record and corrects any error. Under Article 136, the inquiry is narrower: was the decision impugned one that a court of law should not, consistent with justice and good conscience, have rendered? The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that concurrent findings of fact by subordinate courts are not normally disturbed under Article 136, and that the jurisdiction is not to be used as a device to prolong litigation or delay the implementation of decrees.¹⁰

3.3  Implications for the Present Case

Viewed against this backdrop, the Supreme Court’s observation in the present matter — that it found ‘no good ground to interfere with the impugned order’ — is a direct application of the restrictive principle governing Article 136 jurisdiction.

The High Court had decided SA No. 427/2010 on a substantial question of law, and the Supreme Court found no infirmity in that determination warranting its extraordinary intervention. This is entirely consistent with a long line of precedent holding that the concurrent exercise of judicial minds across multiple tiers of adjudication ordinarily suffices to bring finality to a dispute.¹¹

IV.  The Doctrine of Condonation of Delay: A Critical Examination

4.1  The Statutory Framework

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 ¹² provides that any appeal or application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

The provision is remedial in character and is designed to prevent injustice.

The expression ‘sufficient cause’ has been the subject of extensive judicial elucidation. It connotes a cause that is beyond the reasonable control of the party seeking relief — one that prevented them, despite due diligence, from approaching the court within the prescribed time. ¹³

The courts have uniformly held that condonation of delay is not a matter of right, and the applicant must approach the court with clean hands, offering a full and frank disclosure of the reasons for the delay.

4.2  Judicial Standards Applied to Delay Condonation

The Supreme Court has, over the decades, evolved a nuanced jurisprudence on what constitutes sufficient cause. Delay caused by serious illness, natural calamity, administrative lapses in government departments ¹⁴, or genuine misapprehension of legal advice may, depending on the facts, be condoned. On the other hand, negligence, indifference, want of diligence, and financial constraints have consistently been held to be insufficient grounds. ¹⁵

Two important principles have been consistently affirmed. First, each day’s delay must be satisfactorily explained — a blanket assertion that the party was unaware of the judgment or was unable to file the petition does not discharge the burden. ¹⁶ Second, the longer the delay, the more cogent and precise must be the explanation.

A 646-day delay, representing more than seventeen months beyond even the latest permissible date, would attract heightened scrutiny under this principle.

4.3  ‘Gross Delay’ — The Court’s Finding

The Supreme Court’s characterisation of the delay as ‘gross’ is a term of legal significance. It denotes not merely delay, but delay of a magnitude that speaks to a fundamental want of diligence or a deliberate attempt to defer engagement with the judicial process. ¹⁷

In the present case, the Court found that this gross delay had ‘not been satisfactorily explained.’ This is a finding of fact that carries significant consequences: it means that on a fair and objective assessment of the explanation offered, the court found it wanting — neither credible in its factual assertions nor legally sufficient to constitute good cause.

Advocate Vikas Kumar Pandey, appearing for the caveator, would have highlighted to the Court precisely this infirmity — that the petition filed by the petitioners offered no concrete or verifiable reason for the 646-day period of inaction.

In opposing the condonation application, the strategy of the caveator’s counsel would have been to demonstrate that the petitioners had available remedies and access to legal advice throughout the period, and that their failure to act was a matter of choice — or at best, negligence — rather than compulsion.

4.4  The Balance of Equities

An often-overlooked dimension of condonation applications is the balance of equities — specifically, the prejudice caused to the respondent by the delay. When a judgment is pronounced in a litigant’s favour, that party acquires a vested right to the benefit of that decree. ¹⁸

Each day that the decree remains stayed or its enforcement uncertain causes tangible prejudice. A delay of 646 days represents nearly two years during which the respondents — who had succeeded before the High Court — were denied the fruits of their hard-won judgment.

This is a factor the Court appropriately weighs while considering whether to condone delay, and it reinforces the justice of the dismissal in the present case.

V.  Second Appellate Jurisdiction and the Merits Analysis

5.1  Section 100 CPC: The Jurisdictional Filter

Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ¹⁹ provides that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. The High Court is required, before admitting the second appeal, to formulate the substantial question of law, and the hearing of the appeal is confined to that question.

This provision was substantially amended by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, ²⁰ which restored the ‘substantial question of law’ filter that had existed in the original Code but had been progressively diluted over time.

The amendment was designed to curb the avalanche of second appeals filed on purely factual grounds and to accord finality to concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and first appellate court.

5.2  Scope of Supreme Court Review in Second Appeal Matters

When the Supreme Court reviews a High Court judgment in a second appeal under Article 136, the inquiry is further narrowed. The Court does not re-examine the substantial question of law as formulated by the High Court de novo; rather, it asks whether the High Court’s resolution of that question is manifestly erroneous, perverse, or based on a fundamental misapprehension of law. ²¹

The weight of three concurrent judicial opinions — trial court, first appellate court, and the High Court in second appeal — creates a strong presumption in favour of the correctness of the outcome, which the SLP petitioner must rebut by demonstrating a clear legal error.

5.3  The Court’s Finding on Merits

The Supreme Court’s finding in the present case — that it found ‘no good ground to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court’ — is both economical and definitive. It signals that the Bench applied the Article 136 standard, found the High Court’s judgment to be legally sound, and declined to disturb it.

The coexistence of this merits-based finding with the delay-based dismissal renders the order extraordinarily complete — the SLP would have failed even if delay had been condoned.

This dual dismissal has important doctrinal implications. It makes the order more resistant to review or curative proceedings, since both grounds — independent of each other — sustain the dismissal. Even if a review application were to succeed on the question of delay (a highly unlikely outcome), the merits finding would independently sustain the dismissal and vice versa.²²

VI.  The Caveator’s Rights and the Advocacy of Advocate Vikas Kumar Pandey

6.1  The Institution of Caveat Under Section 148-A CPC

Section 148-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ²³ — inserted by the CPC (Amendment) Act, 1976 — provides that any person claiming the right to appear before a court on the hearing of any application may lodge a caveat in respect thereof. Upon the caveat being lodged, the caveator must be served with a copy of the application when it is eventually filed by the petitioner, and the court shall not grant any relief or pass any ex parte order without first hearing the caveator.

The caveat serves as a pre-emptive protective mechanism. It is particularly valuable in the context of SLPs where the respondent — who has already secured a favorable judgment — may fear that the petitioner will obtain an ex parte stay or interim order, neutralising the hard-won decree before the respondent has an opportunity to be heard.

By lodging a caveat in advance of the SLP’s filing, the caveator ensures their presence at the very first hearing.²⁴

6.2  Strategic Value of the Caveat in SLP Proceedings

The strategic value of a timely caveat cannot be overstated. In the Supreme Court, stay orders — even interim ones — can have far-reaching consequences. If a stay were granted ex parte against the High Court’s order in the present case, the respondents would have been deprived of the benefit of the decree for an indeterminate period, potentially causing irreversible prejudice.

By lodging a caveat, the respondents ensured that Advocate Vikas Kumar Pandey was present and ready to oppose any such relief from the very outset.

The Court’s Record of Proceedings confirms that the matter was called for hearing and both sides were represented — a direct consequence of the caveat mechanism functioning as intended. The caveator’s representation by a dedicated arguing counsel equipped to address all dimensions of the petition reflects sophisticated litigation planning.

6.3  Advocate Vikas Kumar Pandey: The Arguing Counsel’s Threefold Mandate

Advocate Vikas Kumar Pandey’s role as the arguing counsel for the caveator encompassed three distinct and equally important mandates, each addressing a separate dimension of the SLP:

(i)  Opposing the Condonation of Delay Application

The first and most immediately consequential task was to persuade the Court that the 646-day delay was unexplained, unsatisfactory, and undeserving of condonation. This involved a two-pronged submission: first, demonstrating the factual inadequacy of the explanation offered by the petitioners; and second, articulating the legal standard — derived from a consistent line of Supreme Court precedent — against which that explanation fell short.

Effective opposition to a condonation application requires counsel to demonstrate not merely that the delay is long, but that the applicant failed to act despite having the knowledge, means, and ability to do so. Advocate Pandey’s success on this point is evidenced by the Court’s express finding that the delay had ‘not been satisfactorily explained’ — language that directly tracks the legal standard for condonation.²⁵

(ii)  Opposing the Stay Application

The second mandate was to resist IA No. 41654/2026, the stay application. Grant of a stay requires the applicant to establish a prima facie case, balance of convenience in their favour, and likelihood of irreparable harm if the stay is refused. ²⁶

Advocate Pandey would have addressed each of these elements in reverse, showing that no prima facie case existed (since the SLP itself lacked merit and was barred by delay), that the balance of convenience favoured the respondents who had a subsisting decree, and that any harm to the petitioners from non-grant of stay was self-inflicted by their inordinate delay.

The disposal of the stay application followed automatically from the dismissal of the main SLP — a consequence captured by the standard Supreme Court formula that ‘pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.’ This outcome vindicates the caveator’s position entirely.

(iii)  Defending the High Court’s Judgment on Merits

The third dimension of Advocate Pandey’s mandate was to address the merits of the High Court’s order in SA No. 427/2010. This required a thorough familiarity with the facts, the substantial question of law as framed by the High Court, and the reasoning by which that question was answered.

The advocacy would have involved urging the Court to apply the restrictive Article 136 standard — demonstrating that no exceptional circumstances warranting interference were present, and that the High Court’s resolution of the substantial question of law was legally defensible.

The Court’s finding of ‘no good ground to interfere’ is the judicial imprimatur upon this submission. It reflects the Court’s satisfaction — after hearing arguments on both sides — that the High Court’s judgment was legally sound and did not exhibit the kind of infirmity that attracts Supreme Court intervention under Article 136.

6.4  The Integrated Advocacy Strategy

What is particularly noteworthy about the advocacy in this case is the integrated nature of the strategy. By addressing all three dimensions simultaneously — delay, stay, and merits — Advocate Vikas Kumar Pandey ensured that the caveator’s position was unassailable at every level.

Had only the delay objection been pressed and the Court been inclined to condone the delay, the merits argument provided an independent basis for dismissal. Conversely, had the Court been inclined to grant stay pending examination of merits, the argument against prima facie case would have undermined that inclination.

This ‘belt and braces’ approach to advocacy — leaving no dimension unexplored — is the hallmark of skilled and experienced Supreme Court practice.²⁷

VII.  Conclusions and Implications for Appellate Practice

The dismissal of SLP (Civil) Diary No. 6439/2026 on the twin grounds of gross unexplained delay and absence of merit encapsulates several fundamental principles of Indian appellate jurisprudence that bear articulation as concrete propositions:

1. The finality of judgments is a value that Indian courts actively protect. Unsuccessful litigants who fail to challenge a judgment within the prescribed period do so at the peril of being permanently shut out, and the courts will not lightly disturb the settled expectations of the successful party.
2. The doctrine of condonation of delay, while remedial, imposes a non-trivial burden of satisfactory explanation. A showing of ‘sufficient cause’ requires concrete, credible, and verifiable reasons — not bald assertions of ignorance or financial hardship.

• Article 136 jurisdiction is not a second round of appeal. It is an extraordinary remedy of last resort, available only where a miscarriage of justice of a kind that the Supreme Court would consider intolerable has occurred. Concurrent findings of subordinate courts, resolved on substantial questions of law, command particular deference.

1. The caveat mechanism under Section 148-A CPC is an indispensable tool in the arsenal of the successful litigant anticipating a challenge to their decree. It ensures presence at the first hearing, prevents ex parte orders, and enables the respondent to shape the narrative from the outset.
2. Effective appellate advocacy requires the arguing counsel to address each ground of the petition — procedural and substantive — with equal preparation and rigour. The integrated approach demonstrated by Advocate Vikas Kumar Pandey in this case, encompassing the delay challenge, the stay opposition, and the merits defence, reflects the standard of comprehensive preparation that the Supreme Court’s demanding environment demands.

For the broader legal fraternity, this case serves as a reminder that litigation discipline — particularly temporal discipline — is not separable from litigation strategy. The best substantive arguments lose their force when they arrive too late. And when they arrive both too late and without merit, the outcome is as decisive as it was in the present case: an unambiguous dismissal on dual grounds, leaving no avenue for further challenge.

FOOTNOTES & CITATIONS

¹  Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 136. Article 136(1) reads: ‘Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.’

²  Supreme Court Rules, 2013, Order XIX, Rule 5 (prescribing a 90-day limitation period for filing Special Leave Petitions against civil judgments).

³  The High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati exercises jurisdiction over matters arising from the undivided Andhra Pradesh region following the bifurcation of the State. Second Appeal No. 427/2010 was a civil second appeal filed under Section 100 CPC.

⁴  Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908), s. 100, as amended by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act 104 of 1976).

⁵  Supreme Court Rules, 2013, Order XIX, Rule 5. See also Prakash Chand Agarwal v. M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd., (1970) 2 SCC 806, where the Court explained the rationale behind limitation periods applicable to SLPs.

⁶  Limitation Act, 1963 (Act 36 of 1963), s. 5. The section provides: ‘Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.’

⁷  Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. IX, p. 1618 (B.R. Ambedkar explaining the rationale for Art. 136). See also Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169, the first case in which the Supreme Court considered the scope of Art. 136.

⁸  Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1995) 3 SCC 243, at para. 7: ‘The power under Article 136 of the Constitution to grant special leave is plenary. It is, however, an extraordinary jurisdiction to be exercised sparingly.’

⁹  Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham, (1979) 2 SCC 297, at para. 7. See also State of U.P. v. Satish Chandra Agarwal, (1986) 2 SCC 555.

¹⁰  Gian Singh v. Gulab Singh, (1991) 2 SCC 452. The Court reiterated that under Art. 136, concurrent findings of fact are ordinarily not re-examined.

¹¹  Dinabandhu Sahu v. Jadumoni Mangaraj, (1954) SCR 615; Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 647.

¹²  Limitation Act, 1963 (Act 36 of 1963), s. 5. See the preamble of the Act which emphasises its remedial character.

¹³  Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107, at para. 3-4 (a landmark ruling laying down nine propositions on condonation of delay).

¹⁴  State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, (1996) 3 SCC 132 (condonation liberally applied to government departments given administrative constraints). Contrast with the stricter standard applied to private litigants: N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123.

¹⁵  P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556 (financial constraints not sufficient cause). See also Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, (2011) 14 SCC 578.

¹⁶  Bhagwati Swarup Dikshit v. Coop. Union Ltd., AIR 1988 SC 274. The Court held that a party cannot explain away delay in a general manner; the explanation must be specific for each period of the delay.

¹⁷  Office of the Chief Post Master General v. Living Media India Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563, at para. 27, where the Court used the term ‘gross delay’ to describe delay that is so substantial as to prima facie indicate negligence.

¹⁸  Bhivchandra Shankar More v. Balu Gangaram More, (2019) 6 SCC 387, at para. 11. The Court emphasised that the successful litigant’s right to enjoy the decree is a legally cognisable interest that must be weighed in condonation applications.

¹⁹  Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908), s. 100, as substituted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act 104 of 1976).

²⁰  Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act 104 of 1976), Statement of Objects and Reasons.

²¹  Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC 722, at para. 7 (setting out the scope of Art. 136 review of second appeal judgments).

²²  See A. Nawab John v. V.N. Subramaniyam, (2012) 7 SCC 738, on the effect of dismissal on dual grounds in foreclosing further challenge.

²³  Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908), s. 148-A, inserted by the CPC (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act 104 of 1976).

²⁴  Jhajharia Nirman v. Rajasthan State Mines and Minerals Ltd., (2013) 9 SCC 494 (on the scope and purpose of the caveat provision and the caveator’s right to be heard before any ex parte order is passed).

²⁵  See Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 (supra fn. 13) and R.B. Ramlingam v. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, (2009) 2 SCC 484 for the standard of ‘satisfactory explanation.’

²⁶  Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., (1995) 5 SCC 545, at para. 42 (on the three-pronged test for grant of stay/injunction: prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable harm).

²⁷  On the multi-dimensional advocacy approach in constitutional courts, see generally: V.R. Krishna Iyer, ‘The Dialectics and Dynamics of Human Rights in India — Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow’ (1999) 40 JILI 1.

Article Publication Notice

This article is published for academic, educational, and informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice. The views expressed are based on an analysis of publicly available court records and established legal principles. The names of certain counsel appearing for the petitioners have been withheld in keeping with the educational purpose of this publication. The only advocate named is Advocate Vikas Kumar Pandey, who appeared as arguing counsel for the caveator/respondent, as confirmed by the official Record of Proceedings dated February 10, 2026.

© 2026 Advocate Vikas Pandey. All rights reserved. Reproduction for non-commercial educational purposes permitted with attribution.